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TRIAL BY COMBAT AND THE NEW DEAL
A NGLO-AMERICAN judicial theory constantly emphasizes
that only the particular and narrow issues brought before
courts by contesting parties may be the basis of judge-made
law. Judicial language not necessary for the decision of those
narrow issues is called by the uncomplimentary name of dicta.
The impression is given that legal rules and principles based on
mere dicta are of doubtful validity. A court is not supposed to
regulate situations merely because regulation is badly needed. A
court should never approve, disapprove, or clarify an entire set
of rules governing a general business situation. A court should
never answer questions. The limits of their power in this direc-
tion is to produce parables out of which further arguments may
be spun.
What the issues of a case are depends upon the record, beyond
the limits of which no court should go. The pronouncement that
assuming certain facts to be true, such would be the law applicable,
which is familiar to continental judges, is supposed in this country
to indicate loose judicial thinking. The court might be aware, as
men of common sense, that the parties desired a general rule to
be adopted or rejected, or the parties might even stipulate that
such was their desire. Nevertheless, the court would be powerless
to discuss the rule or principle if the record, judged in the light of
certain technical rules, did not raise those precise issues.
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TYpICAL RESULTS OF EMPHASIS ON " ISSUES"
The most frequent illustration of this attitude is found in the
repeated exhortation of appellate courts that counsel stay within
the record. The doctrine of judicial notice becomes at times a
convenient escape from this limitation but counsel can never know
how far they may rely on it. Oral arguments are filled with re-
marks which indicate how fixed the attitude is in the minds of
the court. For example, in the recent case of Nebbia v. People
of the State of New York,' a case designed to test the constitution-
ality of far-reaching legislation, argument before the Supreme
Court of the United States on the question of the power of the
state to fix prices was stopped while counsel was asked to point
out in the record where it appeared that the defendant was a milk
dealer, rather than a person who had just happened to sell a quart
of milk for the first and last time in his life. It was apparent that
the sole purpose of the case was to test the power of a state to fix
prices. There was a deliberate attempt to exclude all other issues.
One hearing the argument might easily have gained the impression
that a careless omission in the record might prevent the court from
making a decision for which vast interests were anxiously waiting.
So hallowed is this tradition that the most absurd results are
accepted without comment. In a recent case a receiver was ap-
pointed for a large manufacturing company.' He sold the prop-
erty to a new corporation made up of the original owners. Object-
ing creditors carried the case on appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States. In the meantime the new corporation went
into bankruptcy. Another receiver's sale was held. The property
was purchased again by the original owners for a much lower
price. When the appeal on the first sale was argued the objecting
creditors tried in vain to get a decision which included in its scope
the second sale. But the tradition was too strong. The bank-
ruptcy sale was not within the issues of an appeal involving the
equity sale. It could not be made part of the record. There was
no way known to legal learning by which the court could keep
up with this rapidly moving litigation. It was unable to perform
I U. S. Sup. Ct., March 5, 1934.
2 Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F.(2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), rev'd,
sub nor. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (933).
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the very necessary function of a clearing house where the various
actions of different lower tribunals, all acting on the same general
dispute, could be brought together.
In another recent case the court decided that all indictments
for offenses against the prohibition law may no longer be prose-
cuted because the law has been repealed.' The court said in its
opinion that a case where final judgment was rendered prior to the
ratification of the constitutional amendment presented an issue
not before the court. The attorney general had taken the case to
the Supreme Court for the sole purpose of getting information on
what to do in these situations. But the court felt itself bound by
tradition to withhold part of the relevant information, and to
compel a second suit to determine it.
We may at times even transcend the limits of the record pro-
vided our purpose is not to remedy inadequate presentation of
issues, but to show that the parties desire information on the law
without going through the risks of a combat. Thus in the recent
Lake Cargo Rate case,4 the entire coal industries of Pennsylvania
and West Virginia were awaiting an interpretation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. A bitter dispute was in process of litigation.
The Interstate Commerce Commission had been enjoined from re-
quiring a certain differential between West Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania coal mines. In order to clarify the situation pending an ap-
peal, a compromise rate had been approved. This was considered
by the parties to be only a necessary compromise until the Supreme
Court could make its decision. Instead of deciding the question
which had required so much time and effort to bring before them,
the Supreme Court held that no" issues "were before it. Because
a new rate had been approved in the interim the case was "moot ".
Therefore the Court could not speak. The whole litigation had to
be begun over again.
Even the court's regulation of its own administration must gen-
erally be made at the risk of the parties. In the recent receiver-
ship of the Interborough Rapid Transit of New York Judge Man-
ton's right to appoint the receiver and supervise the receivership
3 United States v. Chambers, 54 Sup. Ct. 434 (1934).
4 United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 (1929). In commenting on
this case Mr. Harvey Mansfield says: "So ended, in a grand anticlimax, five years
of litigation, pursued at a cost, to all concerned, of millions of dollars:" MANs-
MILD, TaE LAxE CARGO COAL RATE CoNTRovERsy (1932) 133.
:1934]
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proceedings was questioned.5 The matter assumed the propor-
tions of a public scandal.' The Supreme Court of the United
States, after an appeal properly taken, finally indicated that Judge
Manton had acted in doubtful taste, though not without jurisdic-
tion. It suggested his withdrawal. This very sensible solution,
however, was obvious from the first. The mails were open be-
tween New York and Washington, and the trains were running on
regular schedules. Only tradition prevented an immediate judi-
cial intervention by the Supreme Court without trial or appeal,
without public battle between members of the federal court. Yet
matters involving millions of dollars had to remain up in the air
until the case could be presented to the Supreme Court in the
guise of legal issues presented on a record.
The outcome of the case was amusing. Inasmuch as the Su-
preme Court advised, rather than commanded, Judge Manton
adopted an attitude of defiance. It began to look as if the whole
matter would have to be brought before the Supreme Court again
in the same cumbersome way by means of additional proceedings,
when the Judge decided to withdraw.' Thus a matter purely of
judicial administration is embalmed among the parables in the
Supreme Court reports, instead of being part of its minutes and
correspondence. The man on the street is somewhat puzzled as
to why this administrative question could not have been frankly
and informally answered by the Court without so much contro-
versy as to the way in which it was asked.
5 Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., i F. Supp. 809 (S. D. N. Y. 1932), 6z F.(2d) 934
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932), 289 U. S. 479 (1933) ; see Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 503;
(1932) 42 YALE L. J. 279.
6 See Frankfurter, N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1932, at 18.
7 The chronology of events is as follows. On Aug. 26, 1932, judge Manton ap-
pointed the receiver of these vast properties. After the matter had gone to the
Supreme Court, judge Manton in a memorandum opinion on June 28, 1933, stated
that he would continue to act in the case. Thereafter an affidavit of bias and
prejudice was filed by the Manhattan Railway Co. It was stricken from the files
by judge Manton on Aug. 2, 1933. Thereupon a petition for a writ of mandamus
and prohibition was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States by the Man-
hattan Railway Co. An order restraining action in the matter by judge Manton
pending hearing on the petition for mandamus was signed by Mr. justice Stone on
Sept. 21, 1933. Shortly prior to the hearing of the petition judge Manton with-
drew from the case. Thus the matter of what judge should sit on this case was
litigated for over a year. The inconvenience resulting to investors and creditors
because the judicial system -could invent no sensible way of quickly settling dis-
putes between its own officers can easily be imagined.
-916 [Vol. 47
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Today we find lower federal courts utterly at a loss to know at
what stage in proceedings under the codes their opinions should
be invoked under the device of injunctions. Cases with differing
results are appearing all over the country. Assuming that courts
are to review the decisions of the various new tribunals which as-
sume such an important place in industrial affairs, no one can tell
in advance either the time of that review, or its scope. It falls
vaguely under the heading of administrative law. The possibilities
of review range from habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, down
through the various doctrines of the criminal law. Yet it does
not appear to be possible to hold a conference of judges to plan
general rules of appeal from these tribunals, or a coherent scheme
for judicial participation in the administration of recovery legis-
lation. Such matters can only be determined at the peril of liti-
gants, when they are presented in the form of contested issues.
The Department of Agriculture was engaged in negotiating a
milk agreement and license in the state of New York. The At-
torney General of New York examined the cases and announced
that the proposed action by the Department was unconstitutional.'
The government proceeded with its negotiations. When the action
is taken, there will be no way in which judicial approval or dis-
approval of its terms can be obtained. The parties must operate
under a cloud until one of them decides to litigate. Even the litiga-
tion may not decide anything, because, if the usual method of start-
ing suit by injunction is taken, the question immediately arises
whether the party raising the issue has exhausted his legal reme-
dies. The courts are a necessary part of the system which finally
approves marketing agreements, licenses, and codes. Yet their
participation in this system is based on a sort of catch-as-catch-
can philosophy.
The major points of constitutionality of the recovery legisla-
tion will soon be decided. Yet the particular provisions of the
hundreds of codes will always be in question. A tentative or
qualified judicial approval during the period of experiment, while
such provisions are in operation, is made very difficult by the no-
tion that courts can finally decide only on issues brought before
them, because time, and place, the parties, and the scope of the
8 See N. Y. Times, March 6, 1934, at i.
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decision are all left to Providence, aided by prevailing conceptions
of pleadings, the record, and res judicata.
Of course, cases may be fixed up to assist Providence in minor
ways, but this process presents troubling and unsolvable ethical
problems. In a recent instance the government desired an inter-
pretation of an agricultural adjustment license. It was suggested
that a corporation be formed which would violate the specific terms
of the license on which a decision was wanted and thus present
the question at the time, and in the place which administrative
convenience considered advisable. The scheme was thought dan-
gerous. No one quite knew whether it was ethical or not. It was
argued that this was the most orderly way of getting the precise
questions before the court to which answers were imperatively re-
quired by a waiting agricultural industry. Yet the spectacle of the
government manufacturing a case to accomplish this violated a
traditional attitude. It was, therefore, thought better to wait, in
spite of the administrative confusion which resulted, until Provi-
dence in its infinite wisdom should send the right kind of a case.
The difference between a moot case and a test case has never been
defined and never will be. The only sure thing is that the one is
bad, and the other perfectly proper.
The recent case of Hillsborough Bank Corp. v. Yarnell,' in
which a Florida judge decided that the Agricultural Adjustment
Act was unconstitutional, has been appealed. In the meantime it
is desired to modify the license under consideration in that case.
The following unanswerable questions arise: (i) Would the pro-
posed modification of the license make the original case moot?
(2) Assuming that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
wants a decision on a new license, must it depend upon the irra-
tional processes of chance and a determined litigant for that de-
cision, or is there some way of getting the new license into the
old record?
Such difficulties may be multiplied indefinitely. They all reflect
the same fundamental attitude, which may be summarized as fol-
lows. The function of the judiciary is to stay aloof from investi-
gation and regulation. Rules and regulations must emerge only
from contests. Each battle is a sort of war to end wars, because it
will aid in the development of principles which will make future
9 (U. S. D. C., S. D. Fla., not yet reported).
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contests unnecessary. Regulations made in advance after investi-
gation of a total situation, rather than a particular case, are not
judicial functions. They are turned over to administrative tri-
bunals with a lower place in the governmental hierarchy. Each
new extension of this power to regulate is regarded as a step to-
ward bureaucracy. Bureaucracy must be curbed by the courts,
but this can only be done by decisions approving or disapproving
action or threatened action which has damaged, or is about to dam-
age, some particular person. The rules themselves can never be
reviewed as a whole by any judicial body, because review of regu-
lation as a whole is not a judicial function.
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE SEARCH FOR ISSUES
The suggestion that a court should be permitted to speak with-
out a contested case before it has been met with an air of shocked
surprise by such persons learned in the law as the writer has in-
terviewed on the subject. It is considered dangerous in spite of
the fact that in large areas of judicial participation in business,
such as consent receiverships, this is exactly what the courts have
been compelled to do. Courts for a long time have regulated in-
solvent business on the sensible lines of control instead of the ro-
mantic technique of battle. The difficulties have arisen only be-
cause the older tradition keeps courts from exercising enough
control. Today, when something of the same type of regulation
is being imposed upon solvent business, the notion of groups
of individuals getting up plans and regulations for the approval
of the court becomes a necessary development. Yet we still pre-
fer a two-party injunction suit to test the operation of a code to
a more sensible impartial examination at the request of interested
groups who are not necessarily fighting each other. The reasons
for this preference are worth examining.
The philosophical rationalization of why courts may not be
trusted to clarify rules in confused situations, except by the hit-
or-miss method of the occasional decision after a contest, is of
course contradictory. That is to be expected. Every human in-
stitution is the embodiment of all sorts of contradictory ideals going
in different directions. To each important institution is attached
a priesthood devoted to the task of proving that which is neces-
1934]
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sarily false, namely, that the institutional ideals are not contra-
dictory, and that they are not going in different directions. In the
law this is accomplished by a science known as jurisprudence.
This science takes the simple emotional ideals to which the judi-
ciary owes its popular acceptance and elaborates them into a
literature with which it takes years to become thoroughly familiar.
Few connected with the judicial institution know anything about
this literature, and when, from a sense of duty, lawyers or judges
peruse works which claim to be jurisprudence, they get a dis-
tinctly fuzzy feeling which they humbly attribute to their own in-
competence. They are, however, profoundly grateful that a little
group of scholars are taking over the task of examining the nature
and sources of the law and finding them to be, on the whole, sound.
Therefore, the fact that the assumptions underlying the science of
jurisprudence, while pretending to be rational, are as a matter of
fact completely irrational, escapes their attention. In the same
way the complete irrationality of the theology preached in this
country from i8oo to i88o, always escaped the good churchgoers
because the length and complexity of the sermons convinced them
that it must be rational. Where there is so much language there
must be some truth.
The task of jurisprudence has been to make rational in appear-
ance the operation of an institution which is actually mystical and
dramatic, and which maintains its hold upon popular imagination
by means of emotionally relevant symbols. If one were com-
pelled to summarize the assumptions underlying the ideal of a
lawmaking body, which never speaks except to settle a combat
properly brought before it, the result would be somewhat as
follows:
(i) Every trial should be a contest over issues presented by the
parties and not an investigation of what the facts were which
created the necessity of the suit."0
10 A typical statement is found in Greenwich Trust Co. v. Brixey, 117 Conn.
663, i66 Atl. 918 (1933). Counsel attempted to stipulate in the appellate court as
to the authority of a trustee to pay taxes, and the court said: " On the other hand,
the agreement of all counsel that the court should uphold the authority of the trus-
tee to make the payment precludes the presentation to us of opposing contentions,
which is one of the great assurances of the establishment of a sound precedent."
The struggle to preserve this same ideal is reflected in all the types of plead-
ing difficulties to which our system has been subject. The difficulty is created by
[Vol. 47
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(2) The unskillful antagonist should lose, because the rules
should be so simple that it is his own fault if he does. Simplicity
of rules is obtained by not permitting courts to clarify these rules
except by penalizing one of the antagonists. To permit anyone to
find out about them in advance would destroy the idea of a
combat. 1
(3) Courts are not permitted to plan their participation in a
new situation, such as is presented by the recovery acts, any more
than they were permitted to plan their participation in arbitration,
rate making, or administrative law. This participation is rather
to be determined by a series of battles. Each particular battle is
a war to end war. 2
(4) Rules governing human conduct will be better and more
consistent if only a small section of that conduct is considered at
a time. It is a mistake for a rule-making body to consider a situa-
tion as a whole."
(5) The best way to avoid litigation is to make the power to
promulgate rules and regulations exclusively dependent upon
litigation. 4
(6) Courts should keep their eyes fixed on the past and follow
precedent. Legislatures should look to the future, and disregard
it. Thus the two extremes will correct each other, if courts in
making their decisions will only keep future policies in mind, and
if legislatures will only have more respect for the past. Thus the
the belief that if a rule of trial convenience is applied to determine what should be
considered a "cause of action ", it would prevent clear-cut issues from being pre-
sented to the courts. The cause of action, therefore, must be a single "right" on
which the plaintiff can recover. In determining what is a right, we are inevitably
led back to the old forms of action at common law. See Arnold, The Code "Cause
of Action" Clarified by United States Supreme Court (1933) ig A. B. A. J. 215.
Entire philosophies of the nature of proof have been based on the notion that a
trial is and necessarily should be a contest over issues formulated in advance.
MICHAEL AND ADLER, THE NATURE op JUDICIAL PROOF (1931).
11 The notion that rules of procedure should be worked out piecemeal by stare
decisis persists in spite of criticism and attack for over a hundred years.
12 See any text on administrative law.
Is Note the reluctance with which courts exercise their rule-making power.
'4 Against this fundamental attitude liberal or realistic jurisprudence has dis-
sented in vain- so deep-seated in our institution of thought has it been. The
American Law Institute, starting out to restate the law, felt that it should do noth-
ing to interfere with this ideal. The failure of this magnificent effort may be traced
to the persistency of this notion. For a brilliant criticism of the ideal, see Cuthbert
Pound, Jurisprudence: Science or Superstition (1932) x8 A. B. A. J. 312.
1934]
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legislative and judicial functions will nicely balance each other,
provided we set up enough administrative tribunals actually to do
the work required.
These assumptions are reconciled with practical efficiency by
the notion that courts are more apt to formulate or apply rules
soundly if the opposite sides are prevented from sitting around a
table together in friendly conference. Mutual exaggeration is
supposed to create lack of exaggeration. Bitter partizanship in
opposite directions is supposed to bring out the truth. Of course
no rational human being would apply such a theory to his own
affairs nor to other departments of the government. It has never
been supposed that bitter and partizan lobbying assisted legisla-
tive bodies in their lawmaking. No investigation is conducted by
hiring persons to argue opposite sides. The common law is
neither clear, sound, nor even capable of being restated in areas
where the results of cases are being most bitterly contested. And
particularly with reference to administrative regulation does
mutual exaggeration of opposing claims negative the whole theory
of rational, scientific investigation. Yet in spite of this most
obvious fact, the ordinary teacher of law will insist (i) that com-
bat makes for clarity, (2) that heated arguments bring out the
truth, and (3) that anyone who doesn't believe this is a loose
thinker. The explanation of this attitude lies in the realm of
social anthropology."5
These assumptions underlying the ideal of trial by combat are
so pervasive that orderly exposition is difficult. Yet in the doc-
trine surrounding three of our most familiar phrases, stare decisis,
15 Referring to the difficulty of escape from this attitude Judge Cuthbert Pound
says: "Can such changes be realized or approximated? They are not inevitable.
They are not even popular with the bar. I can see a certain virtue in walking in
peaceful error in the ancient ways rather than engaging in a struggle for the ideal
system. ' Reformation' is not always synonymous with 'reform.' The old meth-
ods rest on a solid basis. As long as law is, to most people, something to keep out
of and away from, it is not probable that the bar will be active in placing limita-
tions upon its own esoteric activities. Some day, perhaps, some Bentham or Austin
may arouse the people outside the bar associations to a movement to lessen the
expense and the delay of litigation by radical and intelligent revision. Until then
the bar will doubtless retain its characteristics of inertia, conservatism and lack of
intellectual curiosity. The bench will, as usual, resist innovation and approach
with dread any suggestion of cure, rather than mere palliation of symptoms which
indicate weakened heart and lungs, myopia, loss of hearing and other ails of the
body of administrative justice." See Pound, supra note 14, at 314.
[Vol. 47
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the cause of action, and res judicata, and in the institutional effect
of these doctrines, we may find some of the most pertinent illustra-
tive material. Each one of these phrases stands at the head of a
body of literature designed to separate and define the "issues ".
Stare decisis is concerned with what the issues are in appellate
court opinions. Res judicata defines the issues in decisions by
lower courts. And the definition of the "cause of action" is sup-
posed to aid the trial judge himself to determine how issues may
be brought before him. Here we have some of the most abstruse
doctrine known to our legal literature, because the philosophy
which permits courts to speak only on contested issues allows an
authoritative definition of the issues to arise only out of cases
where one of the issues is to define the issues. 6
At the top we find the doctrine of stare decisis. The peculiar
feature distinguishing it from rules like the "jurisprudence con-
stant" of France is that statements in an opinion not required by
the issues are dicta, and therefore not binding precedent. The
philosophical difficulties of this position we will not here discuss.
They have been ably elaborated by Mr. Goodhart," who seeks to
formulate a rule for determining between decision and dicta. The
institutional results of insisting that binding precedent is based
only on issues necessarily decided are far reaching. The most
significant one is the attitude that a court cannot reverse an
opinion, as does the Court of Cassation, but can only reverse a
ruling. Thus it is difficult to make law without penalizing the
16 Note the attempt of a learned scholar to destroy the effect of Mr. justice
Cardozo's liberal attitude toward the code cause of action in the case of United
States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62 (i933). Gavit, A " Pragmatic Deft-
nition" of the "Cause of Action" (1933) 82 U. or PA. L. REv. 129. The author
reflects an interesting attitude common to many legal scholars in his lofty scorn of
trial convenience. But see a reply to this. Clark, The Cause of Action (1934) 82
U. or PA. L. Rlv. 354.
17 See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case (193o) 40 YALE
L. J. 161. Mr. Goodhart shows that if the actual record of the case is taken into
account, it is impossible to formulate any workable rules of stare decisis. The
writer has criticized Mr. Goodhart's notion that the facts of the record must be
ignored. See Arnold, Book Review (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 316. In the light of fur-
ther reflection, such criticism now seems unfair. If stare decisis is to work at all,
it must contain the artificial limitations which Mr. Goodhart imposes. The writer's
attempt to poke fun at the limitation obscured the fact that Mr. Goodhart had done
a real service in setting out with clarity the necessary logical implications involved
in the acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis. No one else has done this quite so
well, and the writer is glad to make this belated apology for his criticism.
1934]
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parties. Statutes prohibiting reversals on any error which is not
"prejudical" or which does not" go to the very right of the case"
are almost universal. Yet in the teeth of such statutes courts
constantly call errors in instructions, pleadings, or admission of
evidence prejudicial when it seems almost certain that they had
nothing to do with the "right of the case ". They cannot escape
the feeling that, if they decide that an erroneous ruling is non-
prejudicial, the real decision in the case will be the ruling on
prejudicial error. The statements of law as to error in the lower
court will only be dictum. Even lower courts will respect the opin-
ion less because they will know they can disregard it and not be
reversed. On account of the fundamental attitude here described
reversal seems the only practical way of keeping the lower courts
in line. And so the plaintiff must continue to suffer vicariously
for his attorney's sins, in spite of attempts to save him through
"prejudicial error" statutes. Even putting the rule against prej-
udicial error in the constitution, as was done in California,"s has
had little effect. This should not surprise us, however, because
procedural reform can never make headway against a deep-seated
judicial ideal. The doctrine of non-prejudicial error realistically
applied would make the decision on the law a separate thing from
the decision between the parties. And this would work havoc with
the picture of trial by combat.
Out of the same feeling that decisions can rest only on issues
arises the interminable dispute as to the nature of the code cause
of action, constantly standing in the way of practical trial con-
venience. Here are found our choicest bits of legal metaphysics.
Dean Clark, by a test of practical trial convenience, attempted to
18 See People v. Wilson, 23 Cal. App. 513, 524, 138 Pac. 971, 975 (9M3), where
the court said: "The phrase 'miscarriage of justice' does not simply mean that a
guilty man has escaped, or that an innocent man has been convicted. It is equally
applicable to cases where the acquittal or the conviction has resulted from some
form of trial in which the essential rights of the people or of the defendant were
disregarded or denied." See also San Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation
Co., Inc. v. Stevinson, 164 Cal. 221, 128 Pac. 924 (1912), 26 Cal. App. 274, 147
Pac. 254 (1915), 30 Cal. App. 405, i58 Pac. 768 (1916), I79 Cal. 533, 178 Pac. 292
(i919), 63 Cal. App. 767, 774, 220 Pac. 427 (1923). Five trials were had over a
course of five years because of various errors which realistically could scarcely be
called prejudicial. This was done in the teeth of the constitutional amendment.
Yet the writer considers that California is more liberal in interpreting "prejudicial
error" than most states.
[Vol. 47
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reduce the subject to common sense.1" The cause of action, he
said, was whatever could conveniently be tried in one suit. This
should be determined pragmatically in the particular case. This
idea was attacked in a series of articles,2" which illustrate the
power of a judicial obsession over the minds of our legal scholars.
Such a rule of practical trial convenience would confuse the issues
in the pleadings, it is argued, and if the issues in the pleadings
are confused, how can we tell which is law and which is dicta in
the appellate courts? Unless issues are defined and separated, a
decision based solely thereon cannot be made; it is the function
of the pleadings to present the facts giving rise to separate legal
rights, not to promote trial convenience, and so the argument goes.
Reasoning so opposed to common sense is not interesting in itself.
However, the fact that it can still be listened to respectfully in the
practical field of procedure shows the pervading influence of the
ideal of a contest over issues.
The doctrine of res judicata has suffered from the same philo-
sophic attempts to define the issues until it has become almost
impossible to state. The easy solution of the problem, namely,
that res judicata should be treated as a loose, equitable rule, pre-
venting parties from reopening cases after they had been fairly
heard, would have appeared to be a confession that issues could
not be exactly defined. To have explicitly recognized that res
judicata might be different in different classes of cases would not
have looked like a legal rule. Therefore, we have a general rule
that the same issues are not to be retried between the same parties,
which in representative suits dealing with interests of various
groups of people, some actually in court and others in court only
by implication, becomes a maze of conflicting analogies.
The effect on the various unrepresented groups and persons of
the decisions passing on administrative regulation can scarcely be
solved by the principles of res judicata. The prevailing doctrine
of derivative suits permits whole groups of people to be repre-
19 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 84.
20 See Harris, What is a Cause of Action (1928) i6 CAI=. L. REv. 459; Gavit,
The Code Cause of Action: Joinder and Counterclaims (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 802
(stating the cause of action on the "substantive right ") ; McCaskill, Actions and
Causes of Actions (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614; cf. McCaskill, Teaching Pleading so
4s to Meet Future as Well as Present Needs (1932) 5 A.m. L. SCHOOL REV. 286.
1934]
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sented, in effect, by parties not of their own choosing. Decisions
vitally affecting industry as a whole may be controlled by stipula-
tions between two parties. Moreover, losing parties who do not
appeal may be bound by res judicata to a decision which is con-
trary to the general code as finally interpreted.
METHODS OF AvOIDING TRL4L BY BATTLE
Devices exist for escaping from this ideal of a court permitted
to speak only after a contest on definite issues, but they are not
important enough to change the general effect of the attitude.
Advisory opinions are occasionally given, but they are infrequent.
Since most of the present regulation is national, they play little
or no part in the present administrative difficulties. Authors of
declaratory judgment acts have been careful to make them only a
minor pleading reform. They insist upon issues and an actual
controversy as prerequisite to declaratory actions. Hence the old
question as to whether a case or controversy exists must be decided
anew each time the declaratory judgment statute is invoked. There
are various limitations, purely technical and all aimed to prevent
courts from actual approval of general regulations under the de-
claratory judgment statutes. Confusion exists whether a declara-
tory judgment may be given on a question of fact (unless, perhaps,
it is a simple, uncomplicated fact). The old ideal of trial by
battle must be preserved even though the ancient fiction of asking
for an injunction is done away with. So thoroughly conservative
have been the reformers who advocated this legislation that it is
very doubtful to the writer whether the declaratory judgment acts
have done any more than add a new common-law writ. The very
fact that it has surrounded itself with such an enormous body of
learned literature, philosophy, and cases during the brief period of
its acceptance in this country indicates that the framers of the
acts have been anxious not to depart from the traditions of the
past. Perhaps it has added something to what formerly could
have been accomplished under a somewhat fictitious use of the in-
junction, but, if so, it is only in rare instances."1 Declaratory
21 My colleague Professor Arnold has been kind enough to permit me to com-
ment upon his views on the declaratory judgment. In his whimsical fashion he
appears to have dealt somewhat cavalierly with the evidence. The declaratory
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judgments which approve or disapprove of entire codes of ad-
ministrative regulation are nonexistent. Declaratory judgments
which are aimed at informing a trade group just what they may
expect from a contemplated course of conduct are so rare as to
be negligible. 2
In view of this development of the declaratory judgment it is
not surprising that it has not been received with enthusiasm in the
federal system. The fundamental difficulty with this device in a
judgment is not a minor pleading reform, nor is it a writ. It is a type of judg-
ment which, by confining the judicial function to adjudication without execution,
enables a court to decide two types of issues: (i) issues not theretofore deter-
minable in any form of proceeding, thereby expanding the conception of "cause of
action" to cases, for example, in which a plaintiff seeks to avert peril and inse-
curity and to obtain a decision before a possibly fatal leap in the dark (Borchard,
Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45 HnRv. L. REv. 793; Borchard,
Judicial Relief for Insecurity (1933) 33 COL. L. Rxv. 648) ; and (2) issues thereto-
fore determinable by a more expensive, cumbersome, or precarious method. It is
in the second type of case that injunctions have often been abused to enable the
court, as Professor Arnold says, to render a declaratory judgment. The suggestion
that a declaratory judgment may not be given on a question of fact is unfounded.
See Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 Pac.(2d) 782 (1931) (change of
neighborhood); Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 12o Atl. 15o (1923) (identity of
petitioner); Ruislip-Northwood Urban Dist. Council v. Lee, x45 L. T. R. 208
(ig3i) (character of property). See also other cases cited in Borchard, The Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act (i934) i8 AfN. L. Rxv. 239, 252-53. The sug-
gestion that a declaratory judgment is a substitute for an injunction is also in the
main unwarranted, for in innumerable declaratory judgments an injunction would
have been quite impossible. The fact that many declaratory judgments have been
rendered and that a literature concerning them has developed hardly seems a fair
ground for criticism, but should be deemed an aid in determining the scope and
limitations of the declaratory judgment. It is true, however, that a justiciable issue
must be presented. As to what is a justiciable issue, our courts have been exces-
sively cautious and our so-called liberal judges have been among the extreme con-
servatives in their conception of the judicial function and in their conception of
the duty of judges to the litigants and to society. The nonchalance with which
they dismiss, on a most technical construction of justiciability or of some procedural
device, long-continued litigation in which adjudication is perfectly feasible, exposes
them to justifiable criticism. Much of Professor Arnold's criticisms might be met
by a more extensive use of the order to show cause, as embraced, for example,
in Section 3 of the New Zealand Declaratory judgment Act: "Where any
person desires to do any act the ... legality . . . of which depends on the
construction . . .of any statute ...such person may apply to the Supreme Court
by originating summons ... for a declaratory order determining any question
as to the construction ...of such statute." See Borchard, supra, 45 HARv. L.
Rv. at 845. Edwin M. Borchard.
22 See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law (1933) Il
N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 139.
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situation requiring regulation is that it makes the parties rather
than the court the judge of what issues shall be decided. It does
not give the court an opportunity to go outside these issues, or to
consider the effect of the decision on grounds not represented. In
a situation, such as the present, when the Supreme Court may well
desire to permit the various regulations being adopted to develop
experimentally, it appears to force final decision on the court by
taking away the language of escape which now surrounds injunc-
tion proceedings -which are, of course, declaratory judgments
in disguise. Thus the general effect of the new writ is to continue
to emphasize the difficulties of the search for contested issues,
without offering any considered plan of judicial participation in
the schemes of regulation which are now appearing. The method
occasionally adopted of holding a suit open for purpose of experi-
mental development, which is found in the Appalachian Coals
case 23 and in the "Packers Consent Decree ,,24 seems more suited
to administrative needs. It is less in the form of a fixed rule ap-
plying to all cases, and it enlarges the possibilities of discretion
without the cumbersome briefs which any suit defining the scope
of the declaratory judgment now involves.
Arbitration, a frequently used escape from the judicial hunt for
issues, has similarly met with confusion when it encountered that
legal tradition. A reading of Mr. Sturges' brilliant and exhaustive
treatise on arbitration indicates a great variety of attitudes toward
judicial review of arbitration awards. There can be said to be
no settled policy.25 These tendencies are noted: (i) to let arbitra-
tion awards strictly alone, whether the arbitrators assumed an
23 United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., 3 F. SupP. 339 (W. D. Va. 1932),
rev'd, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
24 Hearings Before a Sub-Committee On Agriculture and Forestry, U. S. Sen-
ate, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., March 23, April 2-, 1922; In re Packers' Consent Decree
Litigation, Letter from the Att'y Gen., March 1o, 1926, 69th Cong., ist Sess., SEN.
REP. No. 552; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311 (1928); United States
v. California Coiperative Canneries, 279 U. S. 553 (1929) ; United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U. S. io6 (1932); see Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the
Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1933) 46 H-ARv. L. REv. 885. The pro-
ceedings surrounding this consent decree are cited as an example of regulation by
conference and investigation, rather than by definition of issues. Where proceed-
ings under the Anti-Trust Law have taken the form of contests, the results have
been notorious.
25 STURGs, CoxamMERcms ARBrmATIONs AND AwARDs (1930); Phillips, Rules of
Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration (1934) 47 HIAv. L. REv. 59o.
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erroneous theory of law or not; (2) to interfere with awards if
the court thinks that the law has been incorrectly applied; (3) to
permit questions to be asked of the court on agreement of both
parties; (4) to permit questions to be sent to the court on the
demand of either party. The psychological effect of the first at-
titude set out above is that arbitration is an escape from law.
Perhaps it is this which creates the numerous technical decisions
on compliance with the arbitration statute. Certainly arbitration
as an escape from law is an idea which bothers us. It indicates
that our judicial system has been unable to include the settlement
of many important types of disputes. Whether the treatment of
arbitration awards as if they were reports of special masters would
clarify the situation, no one can say. However, we consider the
subject here as illustrative of the kind of difficulty which the idea
of trial by combat involves when it meets practical necessities of
modern disputes. The arbitration machinery has become a device
to maintain the aloof position of courts and to isolate them from
the technique of investigation and conference.
Perhaps the most useful and extensive device for asking the
court questions has been the injunction.2 6 In testing the recovery
acts its use has been frequent. It is a common method of appeal
from administrative bodies. The idea of a contest is preserved by
the phraseology. A large discretion is given upon the principle
that it will never be exercised unless the injury is irreparable. A
paradoxical instance of this fiction is found in the case of Hills-
borough Bank Corp. v. Yarnell2" where a federal judge granted
an injunction against prosecution of violators under an agricul-
tural license, and immediately thereafter the circuit court of ap-
peals stayed the injunction pending appeal. Yet because we do
not regard this fictitious use of the injunction as actually fictitious,
logical confusion follows. No one is sure whether irreparable
injury is sufficiently alleged and proved or when a new administra-
tive remedy is exhausted.2 8 No one knows exactly whether an
26 This has given to review of administrative tribunals the aspect of a hearing
on jurisdiction or ultra vires. See DICKINSON, ADiNmnSTRATIv JuSTICE AND
SUPREMFCY Or LAW (1927) c. XI.
27 (U. S. D. C., S. D. Fla., not yet reported); see Dote 9, supra.
28 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548 (29o8);
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 231 (i9o8); Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U. S. 453 (1919); United States and I. C. C. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265
1934]
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injunction restraining government officials from prosecuting a
violation of the code will make them liable for the prosecution
when the injunction is later set aside. In Oregon a federal judge,
in spite of his decision that a contested code provision was reason-
able, nevertheless continued the order restraining prosecution for
its violation.29 He was not sure that the criminal penalties for
violating the code were not so large as unconstitutionally to pre-
vent the parties from fairly testing the validity of the statute.
The theory is amusing. No one can test a code provision unless
he has violated it. Therefore violation must not be so heavily
penalized as to intimidate persons desiring to stand on their con-
stitutional rights. It is perfectly proper to make the raising of a
constitutional issue hazardous - but not too hazardous. A con-
test is insisted on, but not a cruel or unusual one. Thus a statute
may be unconstitutional for the sole reason that its penalties
prevent anyone from finding out whether it is constitutional or
not.
Nevertheless, in spite of this logical confusion, the use of the
injunction seems to satisfy emotionally the need for formulation
of precise issues better than any other device, where the question
of administrative remedies is involved. It might seem more
logical to use the declaratory judgment, but actually this method
is comparatively rare, probably due to the unfamiliar language of
the formidable literature which has clustered about this more
logical device.
The technique of corporate reorganization has gone far in escap-
ing the limitations of precise issues. Here the court works through
receivers, committees, and masters. Yet even here the influence
of the ideal is felt in the reluctance to abandon the notion that the
perfect legal analogy to selling a railroad is the justifiable sale of
a farm to a hostile creditor."0 The limitations of the record also
U. S. 274 (1924); Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Comm. of N. C., 269 U. S.
278 (1925); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929);
Porter, Auditor v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 (1932); South Porto Rico
Sugar Co. v. Munoz, 28 F.(2d) 820 (C. C. A. Ist, 1928); Royal Baking Powder
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 32 F.(2d) 966 (App. D. C. 1929).
29 See Note, Validity of Allotment Order -under Lumber Code; Suspension of
Penal Provisions as to Litigant Challenging Order (March, 1934) 43 Y= L. J.
80 See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganization (1933) i9 VA. L. REv. 541, 698.
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make it difficult for the court to exercise a continuing supervision
of related transactions after the reorganization plan has once been
approved."
PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS FOR TRIAL BY BATTLE
The fact that the assumptions underlying the emphasis of our
courts on issues are neither consistent nor rational should not be
a source of surprise or a subject of criticism. The reasons given
by the priesthood of a mystical institution for its prestige are
never rational or consistent. The function of courts is largely
dramatic, and drama, to be effective, must not adopt the technique
of science. Disputes have to be settled, of course, in every society.
But in modern government the manner of settlement is utilized as
the exemplification of the ideals behind the government. In
Greece courts did not occupy this peculiar position. In the early
Puritan town meeting type of government, there was no emotional
need for a principle-building judiciary. Yet far-flung govern-
ments from the time of the Roman Empire down have found the
courts a convenient instrument for making real and important to
the people the ideals on which their powers are based. Russia and
Germany today are using courts to picture their governmental
ideals with a frankness which is almost brutal. England and
America are more subtle, but nevertheless accomplish the same
ends. Therefore, the real reason for the idea that courts can try
only ordeals by battle must be sought not in the rational explana-
tions which are themselves part of the drama, but in a description
of the public psychology which compels them to play that part.
The ideal of the common law, dramatized over and over again
by courts, expresses individual freedom from regulation. The
part it plays is supposed to be the antithesis of bureaucracy -
the villain of the piece. It encourages business men to fight each
other for business. It encourages litigants to fight each other to
obtain law. It withholds legal rights from those who will not
fight. Legal rights might become cheapened if they were handed
down to those who do not spend time and money to obtain them.
It is beneath the dignity of a court to become part of regulatory
31 Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F.(2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 193), rev'd, sub
nom. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (i933) ; see note 2, supra.
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machinery, even in a supervisory capacity, unless its interest was
aroused at the sight of a combat.
Thus trial by ordeal developed into a trial by jury. The notion
of a combat found a receptive environment in a society which was
engaged in a struggle to give every man the freedom to fight his
own battles with as little interference as possible. Judicial investi-
gation could easily terminate in search and seizure and even regu-
lation by judges. Bureaucracy and paternalism always lie in wait
to ruin national character 82 by taking away the fighting instincts
of the people. This being the ideal, we find courts presenting a
series of miracle plays to give it a theatrical development. In the
memory of the present generation the moral lesson of the judicial
miracle play has been that rugged individuals are not regulated.
Instead they fight for their rights. In this battle they expect
government to let them alone.
Hence legislation, because it does not exemplify the ideal, is
regarded as only transitory and ephemeral. Judicial principles,
32 Legal literature of the past ten years has been filled with dire warnings of
the dangers of bureaucracy. In the last few years these warnings have assumed
an indigo hue which is quite pathetic. See, for typical examples: McCarran, The
Growth of Federal Executive Power (i933) ig A. B. A. J. 587, 592: "Members of
the Bar of America, are we turning backward? Have we made an 'about-face?'
Is Democracy a failure? ... Experiments are too costly, when they strike at a
principal which secures individual liberty." Beck, The Future of the Constitution
(i933) i9 A. B. A. J. 493, 540: "All we can do is to hope and pray that there
will some day come a rebirth of the old spirit of ordered liberty, for unless it comes,
not only will the Constitution perish in everything except in form, but the Union
itself may not survive the destruction of its fundamental law." The Committee
on American Citizenship, An Appeal to the American Bar (1934) 2o A. B. A. J. x:
"The Committee believes that for the last twenty-five years there has been a grow-
ing disbelief in the value of our constitutional form of government, and that the
Constitution cannot long survive any want of faith in its essential justice and wis-
dom. As it is the organic expression of the Union, the Committee viewed with
grave concern the fact that some leaders of thought, especially in the colleges and
universities, are treating the moral authority of the Constitution with a feeling that
borders on contempt." Fowler, Encroachment by Government on the Domain of
Private Business (1932) iS A. B. A. J. 567, 573, 617: "To invade the realm of
commerce where the inhabitants carry on their business of agriculture, manufac-
turing, barter and trade, purchase and sale, transportation, banking and the nu-
merous and complex activities which make up commerce as a whole, not only de-
stroys individual initiative and ambition but seriously affects, and in the course
of time will utterly destroy, the ability of the individual to support the Govern-
ment by taxation." For more of the same kind of reaction, see any conservative
paper.
Vol. 47
HeinOnline  -- 47 Harv. L. Rev. 932 1933-1934
1934] TRIAL BY COMBAT AND THE NEW DEAL 933
illustrating the non-interference of government, appear permanent
and philosophical. The old saying that any legislation could be
repealed but that the common law endured forever illustrates this
attitude. The great lesson of stare decisis is that the function of
government is to allow free play to principles with the creation of
which the government has nothing to do. What better theatrical
development of this lesson could be devised than the notion that
even courts could not prevent injustice when it occurred before
their eyes. They could only decide issues in a contest.
As regulatory bodies expanded in power and influence the
weight of all our philosophy and our judicial drama was aimed at
keeping them on a lower plane. Principles of freedom did not
find their habitation in surroundings where man is being directed
for his own good. The Lord in Milton's Paradise Lost, confronted
by the same problem, decides it is better to allow man to fall, than
to take any active steps to help him out. He conceives his func-
tion to be that of judging man after he is plunged into the inevi-
table trouble which he foresees. A principle of equity jurisdiction
softens that judgment somewhat, but the great principle that man
could not be directed in advance without ruining his free will is
developed with great dialectic fervor. Here we have poetically
expressed the ideal of the common law. Results are supposed to
be foreseeable at common law, just as they were in Paradise. Yet
the fight between the Devil and the Lord is not subject to regula-
tion. The litigant is penalized by hiring the devil as counsel.
Anything else would create heavenly bureaucracy.
The acclaim given to Paradise Lost because of its ponderous
way of expressing this ideal is not dissimilar to the acclaim given
to legal scholars for performing a similar function. Milton and
Blackstone thought very much alike. The same type of thinking
is found in Hegel, in his elaborate development of the notion that
out of the combat of antithesis comes synthesis on a higher plane.
In such a climate of opinion courts could follow no other ideal
and retain their prestige. The extraordinary way in which leaders
of judicial thought modified the rigor of the ideal, the great judi-
cial literature written in terms of the ideal, the development of
equitable doctrines which run counter to it but which nevertheless
are reconciled with it, compel our admiration. Wars are doubtful
instrumentalities for producing peace, quiet, and certainty, but
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their effect in creating powerful institutions and great characters
can never be denied by the most ardent pacifist.
Thus in the background of the things which we call substantive
law we find that the most sacred and substantive of all is the
notion that a court is privileged to decide only the issues before
it, and that if it goes beyond this it indulges only in loose talk, a
practice not exactly to be condemned, for dicta have their uses,
but certainly not to be encouraged.
THE STRATEGIC POSITION IN WHICH THE IDEAL OF TIAL
BY BATTLE HAS PLACED THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
In a society of clashing ideals and rapidly changing conditions,
courts have been necessarily the representatives of the ancient
order. They have been loyal to the theories of the common law.
But, since the common-law judicial organization was the antithesis
of social control, regulatory functions escaped into another sys-
tem of courts, called commissions. In these bodies a different
technique - the technique of conference and investigation -
took the place of the technique of combat. The judicial system
at first rejected the ideal that the proceedings of such bodies were
their concern. Issues which required practical investigation
rather than philosophical learning obviously were not ," judicial ".
However, this administrative technique began rapidly to spread
to problems so important that courts could no longer ignore them,
and there arose the necessity of finding philosophical formulae
which would make it possible to avoid the methods of investiga-
tion and conference and at the same time to assert judicial su-
premacy over decisions arrived at by these methods. The notion
that they could decide only contested issues put the courts in an
admirable strategic position. It gave them a constant escape
from being rushed into interpretation of regulations at unpro-
pitious times. It enabled them to take pot shots at specific regula-
tions without ever being forced to assume responsibility for the
regulatory scheme as a whole. The court could always refuse
to review because the commission's decision was either final, or
entitled to great weight on questions of "fact". It could al-
ways take back into its power of review any field of the doctrine
that certain facts were "jurisdictional" and, therefore, required
IV0ol. 47
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judicial determination. It could then throw these very juris-
dictional facts back to the commission in cases (such as rail-
road rate decisions) where the evidence was too complicated
for the judicial technique by declaring that the court need go
no further than to ascertain whether there was typical evidence.
It could escape all these formulae at once and regain jurisdic-
tion by declaring that whether the commission acted in an ar-
bitrary manner or whether they properly applied the law was
solely a judicial issue. It could avoid talking about the matter at
all by compelling the litigant to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies, and escape from this rule in turn by stating that it might not
apply to cases of unusual hardship. The court could invoke doc-
trines of estoppel and waiver if the litigant attempted to try out
the regulatory scheme in an experimental way, and ignore these
doctrines when review was desired by taking advantage of the
fact that the seamless web of the law of estoppel and waiver was
constructed on the general lines of Swiss cheese. By using in-
junctions to review the commissions, the court could add to these
doctrines of administrative law all the loose formulae of equity
which sound in discretion and good conscience. In this way to
the two-story structure of law and equity was added a third story
of administrative law, and the whole structure was equipped with
noiseless elevators and secret stairways, by means of which the
choice was always open either to take a bold judicial stand or make
a dignified escape.
By these means courts were able to apply criteria to adminis-
trative tribunals without ever being compelled to elaborate as a
complete whole what the criteria were. Thus was maintained great
supervisory power with a minimum of executive responsibility.
A new and curious legal science known as administrative law grew
rapidly. Although it was the most important of the subjects in
the legal field, because it contained the procedure for the treat-
ment of the most important problems, it did not lend itself to the
typical law school treatment. The American Law Institute never
even attempted to restate it. Its comparative immunity from ef-
forts by conventional legal scholars to clarify and classify it made
administrative law an admirable method by which courts could
keep a dignified distance from bodies which investigated and regu-
lated instead of refereed.
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The judicial position taken in the great areas of governmental
regulation which include rates, zoning, workmen's compensation,
taxation, and unfair trade practices preserved the illusion that the
decision of fundamental principles of jurisdiction was the more
important and dignified duty, and that actual regulation was a
minor affair. It kept constantly before us the idea that adminis-
trative bodies, even when they acted as judges, were only quasi-
judicial. However, the philosophy and argumentative technique
required to maintain this idea became so complicated as to defy
orderly statement. It was easy to imagine a more efficient method
of review of administrative bodies, yet to put it into practice re-
quired a restating of fundamental concepts which would have
given courts more direct responsibility. If the courts had been
able to look at administrative agencies as they did at their own
masters, referees, or receivers, elaborate formulae of administra-
tive law, insofar as they described a method of review, would have
been unnecessary. There would have been no necessity of appeal-
ing such an unimportant case as Crowell v. Benson " to the highest
court in the land in order to get majority and dissenting opinions
on the scope of judicial review over administrative tribunals. Un-
der a scheme of discretionary review the courts would probably
have let commissions alone because this is the history of discretion-
ary review. Certainly they would not have had to reverse minor
cases simply in order to keep formulating an analysis of the scope
of their review. The judicial system might not have split up into
a double-headed affair. It would have had the efficiency of a ra-
tional appellate organization in dealing with matters of regulation
to which the older technique was not applicable.
The spectacle presented to the public of an administrative re-
view similar to the approval of a master's report would have made
the courts appear to approve or disapprove administrative regula-
tions as they were formulated. It would have taken away their
opportunity to talk in parables, and made them responsible for
definite rules. The court would thus have appeared to be an in-
vestigating body, and not an arbiter of combats. We were accus-
tomed to attack regulation by contrasting it with a type of gov-
33 285 U. S. 22 (1932); see Notes (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 478, (1933) 42 YAIM
L. J. 747.
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ernrent which we designated as judicial. This could only be done
by keeping the judiciary apart from regulation. The strategic
advantage of the position which the vague ideal of stare decisis
limited to precise issues, permitted courts to appear as the last
refuge of unregulated individualism. For this purpose it was
worth all the confusion which a separate science of administrative
law threw upon the actual procedural situation.
THE PROBLEM IN 1934
There is today plainly needed an orderly, planned participation
of courts in the growing area of governmental regulation. It is
equally plain that suits between individuals are ineffective as a
method of approving or disapproving governmental regulations.
The real problem has become the balancing of interests of classes,
and of different sections of the country. A system of judicial re-
view which cannot become operative until after the damage is
done, which pretends to affect only the parties to the suit directly,
and the other parties in the same regulatory plan only by infer-
ence, which offers no certain and definite way of getting regula-
tions reviewed in advance of their operation, will tend to isolate
courts more and more from the place which they have heretofore
had in the administration of our law.
We are faced with the conflict of two ideals, one representing
governmental regulation of business, the other representing gov-
ernmental noninterference with business. The second ideal is
the older and finds its embodiment and dramatization in the older
judicial system. The first ideal still encounters emotional diffi-
culties. It is regarded by everyone except the radicals as a sort
of necessary evil. We are endeavoring to conceal it under a series
of euphemisms. The first is the somewhat naive assumption that
the present depression Is an unheard of emergency never experi-
enced in the world before, and, therefore, present developments
are all temporary. A second euphemism is that courts may par-
ticipate in a planned business economy through the medium of
the ancient rules of joinder of causes and joinder of parties, which
leave to the litigants themselves the sole responsibility of deciding
what issues to present and who are to present them.
An elaborate group of administrative tribunals is rapidly taking
HeinOnline  -- 47 Harv. L. Rev. 937 1933-1934
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
form. 4 In this scheme there is no place definitely allocated for
judicial intervention. No one can possibly inform himself of just
when administrative remedies are exhausted, and judicial review
is permitted. The scope of judicial review is unsettled and left to
the loose formulae of administrative law. Conflicting results are
appearing all over the country.
Inconvenient results follow. Since the favorite method of re-
viewing any code provision found to be unreasonable is by the
process of injunction, we find that a court is compelled to tie up
an entire working arrangement in order to give an effective deci-
sion against a single code provision. Business cannot wait on
the slow process of appeal. No code can be suspended while the
Supreme Court is reaching a decision and then take up where
it left off. Therefore, all code provisions are left at the mercy of
lower federal courts. The winner of the first round practically
stops the operation of an entire group, most of whom are not
before the court.
No provision is made for an experimental operation of a code.
Its provisions are either valid or invalid at the time of the decision
and, theoretically, if the code is changed to meet the situation in
the interim, the case becomes moot, because the old code is no
longer in force. There is neither provision by which groups of
diverse interests present a plan before a court, just as a reorganiza-
tion plan is submitted in a situation where the court is permitted
to go into all the relevant factors, nor any necessary representa-
tion of parties who are vitally interested but who may never have
heard of the suit. A court might appoint a master to give a report
on the entire industry, but this procedure has not occurred to any
one as yet. Codes are valid or invalid on the analogy of books
rather than on a present investigation of facts. Presumptions of
34 For some examples, see MANUAL FOR ADjUSTEN OF COMLAINTS, NRA,
Bull. No. 7; STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICIES AND MODEL DRAF'TS FOR MARKETING
AGREEMENTS AND CODES OF FAIR COmrPErInION; Form M-I4., Dept. of Agri.,
A. A. A. In these pamphlets is outlined the elaborate system of administrative
boards which are already in existence. The reader will note that a complete and
complicated appellate system is already in operation in the NRA. The confusion
of appellate review by courts piled on appellate review by administrative boards,
without definite planning as to procedural convenience, relying solely on vague
formulae of equity and administrative law is clearly indicated by even a casual
reading of these bulletins. For an excellent review of the legal situation at present.
see Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 599.
[Vol. 47
HeinOnline  -- 47 Harv. L. Rev. 938 1933-1934
19341 TRIAL BY COMBAT AND THE NEW DEAL 939
the validity of the administrative action are, of course, verbal
weapons to induce the court not to scrutinize too carefully, but no
one knows just how far this doctrine goes.
The rules of res judicata are hopelessly inadequate to determine
the effect on interested groups of legal decisions sustaining or up-
setting code provisions, because no one knows whom the parties
represent. No matter how important it might be to various groups
to take an appeal, it is within the power of particular parties to
compromise after a doubtful decision, without regard to the effect
on numerous persons who are not represented. The situation is
as if a corporate reorganization could be managed in court with
only two parties, while all other parties were allowed to contest the
same matter in any other court where the property of the corpora-
tion might be found.
Evidence taken at one of these judicial reviews of administra-
tive action is becoming difficult to distinguish from argument.
Indeed, the only certain difference between the affidavits of eco-
nomic fact and the briefs is that the former are sworn to. Testi-
mony on such questions of fact as whether interstate commerce
and intrastate commerce are inextricably mingled is not testimony
as we used to know it. The technique of the contested trial is ob-
viously not suited to that type of judicial investigation requiring
conference and advice, rather than combat.
Procedural difficulties such as the foregoing do not arise because
of the selfishness of the bar or from the ignorance or lack of train-
ing of the judiciary. The function of procedure is to stage ju-
dicial proceedings in a dramatic way. Where the drama is at-
tempted to exemplify conflicting ideals, the procedure becomes
confused. Today, when the courts represent trial by battle, and
the administrative bodies represent investigation and regulation,
it becomes almost impossible to join the two procedures in an
orderly and logical way. If everyone agreed that disputes arising
out of administrative regulation should be investigated rather than
tried, there would be little difficulty in formulating a procedure
for judicial review of administrative regulation. Courts would
simply look over the codes, approve them finally, approve them
experimentally, or disapprove them completely. They would call
all such groups which were considered to be vitally interested and
hear their arguments. However, if the bar and the public gener-
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ally assign two different r6les to the judicial and administrative
courts, the procedure which joins them together is bound to be-
come absolutely unintelligible.
We have, in our judicial history, fought our way through a
double-headed system of law and equity courts representing con-
flicting ideals. The mountain of philosophic interpretation de-
signed to show that this was a rational thing to do will be the
marvel of future ages. Law represented rules and logical princi-
ples. Equity represented justice. Law called for a combat be-
tween two parties. A bill in equity called for a discovery and
included as many parties as were necessary. Court organization
and procedure were given the task of reconciling law and equity
on the assumption that they were two different things, both work-
ing for the same end. This explains the involved theological dis-
pute between those who contend that equity aids and assists the
law, and those who contend that equity conflicts with the law.
This entire dispute, curiously elaborate and philosophically pro-
found, is aimed principally at the solution of a very simple pro-
cedural problem, namely, the determination of what counterclaims
should properly be filed when equity and law are joined, and how
equitable and legal issues should be tried. Under such circum-
stances trial convenience could come in only at the back door, if
at all. The recognition of such practical considerations would
have interfered with the dramatization of the two conflicting
ideals.
Perhaps today we must go through with the same kind of verbal
confusion. Administrative courts are being formed representing
government by regulation. Legal courts must be continued which
represent government by battle. We are still struggling with the
confusion of ideas created by a double-headed system of law and
equity courts, each of which was supposed to be a separate and
distinct approach to the problem of administering justice, the one
representing rules, the other justice. The way of thinking in-
volved in this double-headed system was found in the prevailing
intellectual climate of the times. Christian philosophy labored to
explain how man, who was logically damned, could nevertheless
be saved by means of a separate personality. The double-headed
system of courts, therefore, reflected the general ideas of the lay-
man. No one who listened to the sermons of the day could fail
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to see the complete rationality of two courts, one representing
justice, and the other representing mercy.
As the church began to be less doctrinaire about its theology,
and during the same period that Emerson was hailed as our great-
est moral philosopher, it seemed rational to combine these two
functions into one court. Nevertheless both of the two ideals re-
mained emotionally relevant. Neither lawyers nor laymen were
willing to admit that philosophically each ideal did not have a
separate existence. Efficiency demanded a merger. The phi-
losophy of the time compelled continued separation. Therefore
the task assigned to procedure was to join them together. The
task assigned to substantive law and jurisprudence was to keep
them apart.
The result of joining law and equity together procedurally and
keeping them apart substantively has produced a literature which
is very similar to the meditation of St. Augustine on how a perfect
God could create sin. In the same way, why should a perfect set
of legal rules require equitable interference? It was of small im-
portance to those trained in this way of thinking that abstruse
controversies as to whether equity really assisted the law, or
whether it conflicted with it were completely inadequate to deter-
mine such very practical matters as what counterclaims might be
filed, and when jury trials might be had. Therefore, cases are
still being reversed because the parties fail to formulate their
pleadings so that they fit into the picture of a single court with
separate compartments of justice and mercy. It is still of great
importance in numerous instances to decide whether, in a state
which has abolished the distinction between law and equity, so
far as the forms of pleadings are concerned, a given set of plead-
ings are in substance law or equity. The worry about the pro-
cedural effects of this distinction continues to produce a fair pro-
portion of absurd results, because subconsciously we fear that if
we cease to worry about the distinction in procedure, it will dis-
appear in substance.
Perhaps, with the rise of regulating tribunals, we are destined
to go through a similar procedural struggle in the effort to keep
regulation ideologically apart from trial by combat, and at the
same time use both ideals to solve particular situations. The
three-story structure of law, equity, and administrative law is
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fearful to contemplate, but nevertheless it is a distinct possibility.
There are plenty of legal scholars abroad in the land who will
welcome the opportunity to devise the nice distinctions required
for such a structure. There are countless legal periodicals anx-
iously writing to everyone who is suspected of legal learning to
acquire more of the type of articles which they have been ac-
customed to publish. A new field is opening up, awaiting dialectic
exploration and footnotes. It is not likely that writers for law
reviews will be content with the advocacy of a simple method of
discretionary review of commissions by courts, or with informal
procedures by which courts will give speedy answers to questions
asked of them in advance of actual trials. It is, therefore, prob-
able that for a time at least the older technique of footnoted funda-
mentals will be used to determine the time and place of judicial
review of regulatory bodies. A practical discussion of these
problems is still over the horizon. For a time at least two sets
of courts will parallel each other and clash in the haphazard way
in which law and equity courts clashed in the past -the one a
symbol of a law which is above government, the other a symbol
of efficiency and control.
Yet it does not seem likely that the dialectic and philosophical
struggle which attended the separation of law and equity courts
and their final, though incomplete, amalgamation will be dupli-
cated in the development of administrative courts today. That
struggle was the result of a feeling that not even court procedure
could be planned in advance, because any regulation which did
not arise from trial by combat was dangerous. It arose in an at-
mosphere which feared any departure from the past. Economic
science was devoted to pointing out the dangers of humanitarian
ideas and constantly reinforcing the fundamental economic prin-
ciple that no good could come as the result of planning. The
notion of experiment with social organization, voiced by the Presi-
dent of the United States, would have been denounced by both
liberals and conservatives only a short time ago. Fundamental
principles were sought by everyone. The practical convenience
of the day was considered of little importance. Every govern-
mental proposal from the child labor amendment down to a minor
reform of pleading was judged in the light of its tendencies for the
future. The very fact that the immediate object aimed at was of
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unquestioned validity was deemed to make the proposal a trap to
catch the unwary. Since governmental regulation was bad, and
since governmental planning was impossible, it followed that any
temporary good results would inevitably be followed by perma-
nent bad ones. Any one can follow a principle when it is to his
own immediate advantage. The real man of principle cares more
for his principle than any possible advantage he may derive from
abandoning it.
This way of thinking is disappearing." There are signs every-
where that government regulation is becoming an accepted ideal.
35 We quote, as illustrative, from articles written by three leading lawyers who
appear clearly to recognize the changes in judicial attitude necessary in a time of
increasing legislation. Rogers, The Mold of Nationalism on Law and Statecraft
(1933) ig A. B. A. J. 693, 697: "The lawyer's employment and his technique will
alter. The wholesale resort to a wide authority and discretion entrusted to public
officers is not only the tendency of the hour everywhere but seems a necessary de-
mand for the execution of rapid experiments in social management, the inculcation
of new conceptions and the alternation of permission and refusal explicit in a pro-
gram of a disciplined economy. The common law has had little sympathy for such
wide official scope. It scorns such marching and counter-marching and dreads its
abuse. The judicial proceedings favored by the common law are characteristically
begun after the event. . . . While the new r6gime repudiates many tenets of Eng-
lish common law, it cannot be left free to proceed without chart or principle. New
doctrines must be found. The outlines of economic laws, industrial practice and
other social observations have already superseded older legalistic guides in the con-
duct of railroad and public utility tribunals on this continent. The same type of
resort to wide fields of observation or learning seems natural for the spread of ad-
ministrative practices over the whole field of business. The lawyer must outline
new rules and systems for control of administrative discretion. He must invent
them or find them in Roman and Eastern sources. He must apply himself to social
principles our law books never bound in print." Cuthbert Pound, supra note 14,
at 313-14: "Might the court, restored to its once narrow but important duty to
harmonize conflicting decisions of the Appellate Divisions and to decide great pub-
lic questions, be empowered, without placing too heavy a burden of work on it, to
act in the capacity of a ministry of justice or, with certain additions from bench
and bar, as a judicial council, centralizing the machinery for the distribution of
judges for trial work and formulating restatements of the law for legislative ac-
tion? Or must individualistic judges continue to run their own assignments at will
as to hours of labor and length of terms? Must rules of law continue to be stated
by the courts only as they arise in litigation between private individuals in which
the state has no interest and be so stated in accordance with precedent, if precedent
exists and may not be avoided?" See also Stephens, What Courts Can Learn from
Commissions (1933) ig A. B. A. J. 141: "Probably all is not perfection in the com-
missions in the respects referred to; but the freedom of administrative tribunals
from legislatively laid down practice, their power to make their own rules, and to
amend them to conform to the actualities of the problems to be met and the types
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If this is so, courts may be expected to follow that way of think-
ing in relation to their own processes. Judged by the ideal of
efficient planning, trial by combat in the field of governmental
regulation will appear more and more absurd. A judicial system
which achieved practical results in the difficult philosophical at-
mosphere of the past should have little difficulty if the intellectual
labor of reconciling all their practical results with a conflicting
philosophy is removed.
The requirements necessary for an orderly review of administra-
tive tribunals are relatively simple once we rid them of their
philosophical trappings. The machinery for satisfying these re-
quirements is already at hand, having been developed sub rosa out
of the necessities of the past. We will briefly enumerate them.
(i) There must be a method by which judicial approval of a
regulation may be tentatively given during an experimental period.
We have instances of this already. In the Appalachian Coals
case 6 the Supreme Court indicated that its decision was operative
for the time being only, and might be modified by subsequent
changes of conditions. The case was kept alive expressly for that
purpose. Such a device applied to the codes would give a tempo-
rary validity or a temporary suspension of code provisions which
could be later modified.
(2) Cases involving approval or disapproval of administrative
regulations must be considered in the light of interests of whole
groups of people. Two parties must not be permitted to control
the entire litigation. The analogy of the creditors' suit which
begins a corporate reorganization may be useful here. Such a
suit is supposed to be representative. All sorts of conflicting in-
terests have a standing for appeal. Suits for injunctions against
provisions of NRA codes may be twisted into the same form, to
enable courts to treat such litigation as determining the broad
principles under which whole groups of conflicting interests must
be reconciled.
(3) There must be speedy methods of appealing precise ques-
tions to the Supreme Court of the United States, unencumbered
of cases to be tried, gives them a freedom of choice and a resultant simplicity of
procedure which they will do well to retain, and with which courts might whole-
somely be endowed."
36 See note 23, supra.
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with procedural formulae. The method of certifying questions to
be answered is suggested here as a useful analogy.
(4) There must be some planned participation of federal courts
in governmental regulation. The power of the court to make
equity rules, together with the conference of Senior Circuit Court
Judges may stand in good stead here, aided perhaps by legislation.
None of this machinery was available when equity and law be-
gan and ended their long conflict. These two ways of talking and
thinking existed at a time when the conception of a judiciary
which talked in parables about ancient battles between litigants
was uppermost. Once regulation is established, the parable way
of talking becomes difficult to maintain. The battery of legal
analogies which may be applied to any case which starts as a
contest is much more difficult to apply to a case which starts to
interpret a rule already formulated. The difference between
French and American digests of law bears witness to this.
A period of confusion, during which the judicial participation
will be confused and uncertain, is inevitable. Yet in an age when
orderly planning is regarded everywhere as a possibility, where
laissez faire is no longer the ultimate ideal, it is probable that
courts also will be driven to intelligent procedural planning. The
hit-or-miss methods of waiting until Providence leaves just the
right case at the judicial doorstep before giving a waiting industry-
any enlightenment is apt to appear in the future less rational than
it did in the past.
CONCLUSION
judicial systems seldom respond to exhortations of reformers
that they become practical and efficient. They constantly show
a resistance to the demands of everyday needs. When considera-
tions of efficiency are forced upon them, legal scholars usually
rush to the defense to show that in the long run an inefficient
method of doing things is more efficient than an efficient one would
be. Government never is what it ought to be, yet all rules must
be based on government as it ought to be. We cannot make rules
to apply to government as it is without abandoning our ideal. It
is, therefore, natural that our most cherished legal phrases should
be more decorative than sensible. Too much common sense, how-
ever, cannot be applied to institutional utterances. On the New
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York post office is the motto: "Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor
gloom of night shall stay these messengers from the swift com-
pletion of their appointed rounds." Common sense tells us that
this means only that mail will be delivered even in bad weather.
A longer motto on the Washington post office means that mail is
only delivered to nice people for laudable purposes. Yet who
wants to strip these mottoes of their decorative quality so long as
they tend to create loyalties and enthusiasm? The same may be
said of the elaborate formulae surrounding trial by combat. So
long as they met a deeply felt emotional want, the mere fact that
they were not what they pretended to be, that they could not be
a sensible way of investigating the truth or a rational way of mak-
ing a system of regulations, in no way affected their vitality as an
ideal.
Those who misunderstand the function of courts are constantly
engaged in the game of finding some ill-defined group on whom
the blame for the practical failures of the institution may rest.
They denounce the stupidity of judges, the lack of integrity of
shysters, or the selfishness of the bar- just as if these were or-
ganized groups endowed with a group freewill. The double r6le
which courts play in satisfying both the practical and pontifical
needs of the time, appears to such persons hypocritical. Con-
fusion of terminology resulting from the conflict of unexamined
emotional values, such persons think, can be solved by clearer
definition. Thus thousands of pages are written to make the
definitions surrounding trial by combat in its conflict with social
justice and administrative control definite and certain. This is
done in utter disregard of the fact that once a word is elaborately
defined it becomes useless as a medium of compelling definite
action.
Such attempts are inseparable from the judicial process. They
perform a useful function, because by seeking definiteness we gain
elasticity; through confusion of terms we gain freedom from
terms. Without this process of constant and conflicting definition,
stare decisis would not be the easy method of escaping from prece-
dent which at present constitutes its most outstanding utility.
It is of course true that our great definers are unaware of the part
they play in giving to the law that flexibility which comes only
from arguments and analogies which lead both ways. Yet that
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very fact makes them play their part better. There is, therefore,
a practical elasticity in the old ideals which permits almost any
degree of judicial review of regulation at the price of conflict and
cumbersome formulae for administrative law.
Yet, if the American people once accept regulation as a normal
function of government, we may no longer feel the emotional need
of trial by combat. If this happens we may then expect our courts
to proceed with greater simplicity and greater efficiency as part of
a uniform judicial system. Regulation, we suspect, is here to stay.
We also predict that the ideal of an independent judiciary above
the regulative departments of the government is as strong as ever.
The greatest obstacle to sensible judicial review of regulation lies
in the notion of trial by combat with its search for the definite is-
sues without which no contest can be staged. There is at least
some evidence that this notion is disappearing, and that public
psychology is ready to accept a unified instead of a double-headed
system. If so, the long and cumbersome conflict between law and
equity may not be repeated with the rise of administrative
regulation.
Thurman W. Arnold.
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